CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1618
22 June 2000

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 21 JUNE 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF COLOMBIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE PARAGRAPHS RELATING TO DISARMAMENT CONTAINED IN THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED: "CARTAGENA DE INDIAS DECLARATION RIO GROUP 2000: COMMITMENT FOR THE MILLENNIUM", ADOPTED AT THE FOURTEENTH SUMMIT MEETING OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE RIO GROUP, HELD ON 15 AND 16 JUNE 2000

I have the honour to transmit in the annex to the present letter the paragraphs relating to disarmament contained in the document entitled: "Cartagena de Indias Declaration Rio Group 2000: Commitment for the Millennium", adopted at the fourteenth summit meeting of heads of State and Government of the Rio Group, held on 15 and 16 June 2000, with the request that the text of these paragraphs be distributed as unofficial document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Camilo Reyes Rodríguez
Ambassador,
Head of Mission

CARTAGENA DE INDIAS DECLARATION

Rio Group 2000

Commitment for the Millennium

...

13. As the world's first densely populated region to be free of nuclear weapons, with the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, we maintain that nuclear disarmament is the responsibility of all States, primarily those which possess nuclear weapons, and that it is incumbent on the international community, represented in the United Nations, to take specific steps to promote the non-proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons. We express our satisfaction with the outcome of the last Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which contained an unequivocal commitment to the complete elimination of such weapons, and we reaffirm our support for the initiative on a new agenda for disarmament.

14. In our hemispheres, we have developed such instruments as the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Materials, and we have undertaken to promote international agreement on this issue in the framework of the negotiations of the United Nations Convention against Transitional Organized Crime and to build on those activities on the occasion of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, to be held in the year 2001.

15. We urge all States which have not yet done so to ratify as soon as possible the Ottawa Convention, to ensure the complete eradication of anti-personnel mines, and we renew our commitment to the rehabilitation of victims and to the clearance of mines in our region, as well as to the goal of transforming our hemisphere into a zone free of anti-personnel mines. We agree that the use of excessively cruel or inhuman weapons, particularly those which are home-made, should be prohibited in conflicts of any kind.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1619
27 June 2000

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 22 JUNE 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE ON 17 JUNE 2000 BY MR. VLADIMIR V. PUTIN, PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ON THE OCCASION OF THE SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement made on 17 June 2000 by Mr. Vladimir V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation, on the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol) and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention.

I should be grateful if this statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed): Vasily SIDOROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Head of delegation of the
Russian Federation to the
Conference on Disarmament

STATEMENT MADE ON 17 JUNE 2000 BY MR. VLADIMIR V. PUTIN, PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

This year the international community is observing two important events: the seventy-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol) and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention.

These multilateral agreements play a substantial role in the international security system. Our country firmly adheres to the provisions and principles which they contain. On 22 May 2000, a federal bill on the withdrawal of the reservations to the Geneva Protocol made by the USSR in 1928 was tabled in the State Duma.

In turn, we are counting on the scrupulous observance of these agreements by the other States parties as well.

As a depositary country, Russia has constantly advocated the establishment of effective arrangements for monitoring compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention and is taking an active part in the negotiations to develop a protocol to strengthen and improve the Convention.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1620
29 June 2000

Original: ENGLISH

Proposal by the President
on the Programme of Work for the 2000 session of the Conference on Disarmament

1. **Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, under agenda item 1, an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

2. **Nuclear disarmament**

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, under agenda item 1, an Ad Hoc Committee/Ad Hoc Working Group to deal with nuclear disarmament, through an exchange of information and views on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to attain this objective.

3. **Prevention of an arms race in outer space**

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, under agenda item 3, an Ad Hoc Committee/Ad Hoc Working Group to examine and identify specific topics or proposals that might be a basis for subsequent in-depth consideration, which could include confidence-building or transparency measures, general principles, treaty commitments and the elaboration of a regime capable of preventing an arms race in outer space.

4. **Negative Security Assurances**

The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, under agenda item 4, an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

5. **Anti-personnel landmines**

The Conference on Disarmament decides to appoint a Special Coordinator, under agenda item 6, to seek the views of its Members on the most appropriate way to deal with the questions related to anti-personnel landmines taking into account, inter alia, developments outside the Conference.

6. **Transparency in armaments**

The Conference on Disarmament decides to appoint a Special Coordinator, under agenda item 7, to seek the views of its Members on the most appropriate way to deal with the questions related to this item.

7. **Conference on Disarmament**

The Conference on Disarmament decides to appoint Special Coordinators on the review of its agenda, the expansion of its membership and its improved and effective functioning.

GE.00-62042

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1621
6 July 2000

Original: ENGLISH

SOUTH AFRICA

OPERATION MOUFLON: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE'S (SANDF) REDUNDANT STOCKPILE OF SMALL ARMS AND SPARE PARTS

INTRODUCTION

1. During a meeting of the Plenary Defence Staff Council on 1 October 1998 it was decided to destroy all redundant small arms and spare parts in possession of the SANDF by means of fragmentation. This project was titled Operation Mouflon.

2. These weapons became redundant and/or obsolete due to the availability of more advanced technology, or were confiscated by the SANDF during military operations. The decision to destroy these weapons is in line with international efforts to address the problem of small arms proliferation, from there the decision to rather destroy such weapons than to sell them.

3. Various national organisations such as Gunfree South Africa also supports the destruction of redundant and obsolete weapons instead of selling them.

4. Sufficient funds for the destruction of these weapons have been one of the main reasons for the delay wrt the physical destruction of the weapons, which according to an estimation would amount to R1 982 665. On 12 February 2000 the Norwegian Government signed an agreement with the Department of Defence whereby they donated an amount of 520 000 Norwegian Krone (approximately R403 100) to the funding of the project.

5. Sufficient funds were allocated by 31 May 2000 and contracts signed with two destruction companies in Benoni and Port Elizabeth in South Africa.

6. The spectrum of weapons and spare parts to be destroyed consists of a total number of 262 667 weapons smaller than 12,7mm. Appended below is a list indicating the kinds and quantities of weapons earmarked for destruction.

EXECUTION

7. Operation Mouflon consisted of three phases, i.e

(a) Preparation Phase

This included the design of accounting and verification procedures, as well as the appointment of personnel to execute the verification and accounting process at the various depots where the weapons were stored.

(b) Execution Phase

This consisted of the verification and accounting of weapons to be destroyed, the transporting thereof to the destruction facilities, as well as the physical destruction of the weapons and spare parts.

(c) Finalisation Phase

This includes the finalisation of outstanding computer accounting transactions, as well as the auditing of the whole process.

8. Strict physical security, verifying and accounting procedures were implemented to ensure the smooth progress of the operation.

9. The verification and accounting for example consisted of the following:

(a) A weapons expert would identify the weapons in a loud voice, while removing the working parts thereof.

(b) The serial number of the weapon was then read out loudly, captured on computer and the weapon marked with spray paint.

(c) Hereafter the serial number of the weapon was again read out by another member captured on a second computer and marked with different colour spray paint. The computers were linked and the program used would immediately indicate if separate weapons with the same serial number were identified. In such cases the weapon was marked clearly, tagged and documented and then packed.

(d) Weapons which had no serial numbers were detected at the first computer, tagged and documented and put back in the production line.

(e) During the process the serial numbers of the weapons earmarked for destruction were never compared with the inventory lists of SANDF weapons. Only after destruction, the lists of destroyed weapons would be compared with the inventory lists and the latter then amended accordingly.

(f) Once the process were completed at a specific depot, the chief verification officer would verify the correctness of the process and only then would the weapons be transported to the destruction facility for physical destruction.

LIST OF WEAPONS TO BE DESTROYED

DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY
7,62mm R-1 Rifles	198 506
7,62mm R-1 Rifles for paratroopers	1 326
7,62mm R-1 Rifles heavy barrel rifles	2 914
7,62mm M-1 FN rifles	3 708
R-2 rifles	12 237
Bren Light Machine Guns	3 637
Vickers Machine Guns	2 256
12,7mm Browining Machine Guns	412
Uzzi Sub-Machine Guns	1 259
Other small calibre weapons (eg AK-47 rifles)	36 412
TOTAL	262 667

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1622
4 August 2000

ENGLISH
Original: CHINESE AND RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 1 AUGUST 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHINA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AND THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE CHINESE AND RUSSIAN TEXTS OF THE JOINT STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON 18 JULY 2000 CONCERNING ANTI-MISSILE DEFENCE

We have the honour to forward to you the Chinese and Russian texts of a joint statement made by the President of the People's Republic of China and the President of the Russian Federation on 18 July 2000 concerning anti-missile defence.

We would be grateful if this joint statement could be issued and circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) HU Xiaodi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of China
to the Conference on Disarmament

(Signed) Vasily SIDOROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Head of delegation of the
Russian Federation to the
Conference on Disarmament

JOINT STATEMENT BY JIANG ZEMIN, PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND VLADIMIR V. PUTIN, PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ON ANTI-MISSILE DEFENCE

The President of the People's Republic of China and the President of the Russian Federation state as follows:

The development of the international situation has fully demonstrated the correctness of the conclusions and assessments relating to issues of anti-missile defence contained in the joint statement on Chinese-Russian relations on the threshold of the twenty-first century, adopted at the summit meeting between China and the Russian Federation on 23 November 1998, the Chinese-Russian press communiqué of 14 April 1999 on consultations on issues related to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the joint Chinese-Russian statement adopted at the summit meeting on 10 December 1999.

The 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (hereinafter the ABM Treaty) remains the cornerstone of global strategic stability and international security and forms the basis for a framework of key international agreements designed to reduce and limit strategic offensive weapons and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Upholding the ABM Treaty and strict compliance with its provisions are therefore matters of paramount importance.

In this connection, the plan by the United States of America to establish a national anti-missile defence system for the territory of its country, a system prohibited under the ABM Treaty, is a cause of profound concern. China and Russia hold that this plan is, in essence, aimed at seeking unilateral superiority in the military and security arena. Implementation of the plan would have the gravest adverse consequences for the security not only of China, Russia and other States, but also for that of the United States itself and for global strategic stability in the world as a whole. For that reason, China and Russia resolutely oppose this plan.

The collapse of the ABM Treaty would trigger another round of the arms race and reverse the positive trends that have emerged in international politics following the end of the cold war. This is emphatically not in the fundamental interests of any country in the world. Those countries pressing for an amendment of this fundamental treaty in the realm of disarmament will have to bear full responsibility for undermining international stability and security and for all the consequences resulting therefrom.

An analysis of current international realities demonstrates that it is quite unjustifiable to invoke the so-called missile threats from certain countries as a pretext for amending the ABM Treaty. Proposals for the so-called "amendment" of this Treaty are in effect a disguised attempt to contravene its provisions. Changing the text of the ABM Treaty is tantamount to scrapping the whole Treaty with all the negative consequences that this would entail. In the current strategic situation, it is vital that the integrity and force of the ABM Treaty should be preserved intact.

The proper response to the new challenges in the field of international security, the maintenance of world peace and the safeguarding of the legitimate security interests of all countries should not be to scrap the ABM Treaty, but instead to promote the establishment of a new, just and equitable international political order, to spurn the practice of power politics and the excessive use of military force in international affairs and further to strengthen regional and international security. At the same time, it is important that Russia and the United States of America should continue, on the basis of strict compliance with the ABM Treaty, the process of reducing offensive strategic weapons and should further intensify that process, with the involvement, in due course, of the other nuclear Powers. It is imperative that, with the use of political, legal and diplomatic means, stepped up international efforts be made to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles, that the possibility be explored of gradually developing a global system for monitoring the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies and that countries engage in a broad and non-discriminatory dialogue and pursue cooperation in this area.

Non-strategic missile defence and international cooperation in this field, though not prohibited under the ABM Treaty, should nevertheless not be permitted to prejudice the security interests of other countries, to lead to the establishment or strengthening of exclusive military and political blocs or to undermine global and regional stability and security. Proceeding from this position, China and Russia voice their grave concern about and firm opposition to the plans of certain countries aimed at the deployment of such a non-strategic missile defence system in the Asia-Pacific region, which would have the negative impacts outlined above. The incorporation in any form of Taiwan into anti-missile defence systems set up by foreign States is unacceptable and will seriously undermine stability in the region.

The resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session on the preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems is of prime importance. China and Russia call upon the international community to continue to give serious attention to the vigorous pursuit by the States concerned of anti-missile defence systems liable to undermine the global strategic balance and stability and to take the necessary measures to halt these perilous developments.

Progress to date in cooperation between China and Russia in maintaining the global strategic balance and stability gives cause for satisfaction. Building on the relationship of trust, equality and partnership in their strategic cooperation, China and Russia shall continue their close coordination in the matters outlined above and, within the framework of their respective international obligations, will continue to strengthen their cooperation in other related areas with a view to ensuring their own security as well as that of the region and the world as a whole.

(Signed) JIANG Zemin
President of the
People's Republic of China

(Signed) Vladimir V. PUTIN
President of the
Russian Federation

Beijing, 18 July 2000

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1623
8 August 2000

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 4 AUGUST 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONCERNING THE KAZAKH-UNITED STATES CALIBRATING EXPERIMENT "OMEGA 3" AT THE FORMER SEMIPALATINSK TEST SITE

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan concerning the joint Kazakh-United States calibrating experiment "Omega 3" at the former Semipalatinsk test site.

I should be grateful if this statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed): Nurlan DANENOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
Republic of Kazakhstan
Head of delegation to the Conference
on Disarmament

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan

On 29 July 2000, at the former Semipalatinsk test site, in horizontal tunnel 160 in the Degelen mountain range, an explosion was conducted of 100 metric tons of granulotol, resulting in the destruction of the last horizontal tunnel intended for nuclear weapon tests.

This was the third in the series of Kazakh-United States calibrating experiments conducted at the test site.

At the same time as destroying the horizontal tunnel, the experimental explosion was used to test and calibrate the international nuclear test monitoring system under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, to which the Republic of Kazakhstan is also a party.

The information gained from these experiments will enable the international community to detect and more precisely identify nuclear explosions (distinguishing them from earthquakes and explosions of conventional explosives) and thereby ensure effective monitoring of compliance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and to set in place the sort of monitoring systems which would render impossible the conduct at any point on the globe of secret nuclear tests undetectable by the international community.

The "Omega 3" experiment is of particular significance as it has successfully concluded the five-year joint Kazakh-United States programme to destroy the nuclear weapons test infrastructure, comprising the closure of the horizontal tunnels and the destruction of the vertical shafts at the Semipalatinsk test site.

Astana, 2 August 2000

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1624
24 August 2000

Original: ENGLISH

Proposal by the President
on the Programme of Work for the 2000 session of the Conference on Disarmament

Draft decision

The Conference takes the following decisions:

1. The Conference establishes, for the duration of the 2000 session, an Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 1 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Ad Hoc Committee shall exchange information and views on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to attain this objective.

The Ad Hoc Committee shall take into consideration all relevant views and proposals present and future and also address questions related to its mandate.

The Ad Hoc Committee shall present a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 2000 session.

2. The Conference establishes, for the duration of the 2000 session, an Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 1 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" which shall negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The Ad Hoc Committee shall present a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 2000 session.

3. The Conference establishes, for the duration of the 2000 session, an Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 3 entitled "prevention of an arms race in outer space" to deal with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Ad Hoc Committee shall examine and identify specific topics or proposals, which could include confidence-building or transparency measures, general principles, treaty commitments and the elaboration of a regime capable of preventing an arms race in outer space.

The Ad Hoc Committee shall take into consideration all relevant views and proposals present and future and also address questions related to its mandate.

The Ad Hoc Committee shall present a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 2000 session.

4. The Conference establishes, for the duration of the 2000 session, an Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 4 entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These arrangements could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

The Ad Hoc Committee shall take into consideration all relevant views and proposals present and future and also address questions related to its mandate.

The Ad Hoc Committee shall present a report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 2000 session.

5. The Conference appoints a Special Coordinator under agenda item 6 entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" to seek the views of its Members on the most appropriate way to deal with the questions related to anti-personnel landmines taking into account, inter alia, developments outside the Conference.

6. The Conference appoints a Special Coordinator under agenda item 7 entitled "Transparency in armaments" to seek the views of its Members on the most appropriate way to deal with the questions related to this item.

7. In implementing these decisions, the Special Coordinators shall take into consideration all relevant views and proposals, present and future.

8. The Conference requests the Special Coordinators to present early and regular reports on the outcome of their consultations throughout the session, including before the end of the 2000 session.

9. The Conference also decides to appoint Special Coordinators on the Review of its Agenda, the Expansion of its Membership and its Improved and Effective Functioning. These Special Coordinators, in discharging their duties and functions, will take into account all proposals and views, as well as future initiatives. The Conference requests these Special Coordinators to report to it before the conclusion of the 2000 session.

10. The taking of these decisions contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 does not prejudge the positions of delegations on the eventual establishment of subsidiary bodies on the issues identified, but reflects agreement to advance the Conference's work with a view to reaching consensus. This decision is also taken without prejudice to the rights of Members of the Conference to move forward with positions and proposals already made or to be put forward in the future.

Draft Presidential declaration

In connection with the decision we have just taken on the Programme of Work, I should like, in my capacity as President of the Conference, to stress that the Conference on Disarmament is a disarmament negotiating forum, as stated in Rule of Procedure nr. 1, and that, therefore, the mandates of, and the work to be pursued by, the subsidiary bodies set up by that decision are to be understood under that light. It is also understood that progress in the work of the Conference on Disarmament will continue to be influenced by and responsive to developments in the international strategic scene which affect the security interests of its individual member States.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1625
13 September 2000

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 SEPTEMBER 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF REMARKS MADE BY PRESIDENT CLINTON ON 1 SEPTEMBER 2000 AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CONCERNING NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE, AS WELL AS A FACT SHEET ON MISSILE DEFENSE

Attached is the text of remarks made by President Clinton on 1 September 2000 at Georgetown University concerning National Missile Defense, as well as a fact sheet on Missile Defense.

I would be grateful if you would issue these texts as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participant States of the CD.

(Signed) Robert T. Grey, Jr.
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the United States of America to the
Conference on Disarmament

GE.00-63379

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

Gaston Hall
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. When you gave us such a warm welcome, and then you applauded some of Dean Gallucci's early lines, I thought to myself, I'm glad he can get this sort of reception, because I gave him a lot of thankless jobs to do in our administration where no one ever applauded -- and he did them brilliantly. I'm delighted to see him here succeeding so well as the Dean. And Provost Brown, thank you for welcoming me here.

I told them when I came in I was sort of glad Father O'Donovan wasn't here today, because I come so often -- I know that at some point if I keep doing this he will tell me that he's going to send a bill to the U.S. Treasury for the Georgetown endowment.

I was thinking when we came out here and Bob talked about the beginning of the school year that it was 35 years ago when, as a sophomore, I was in charge of the freshman orientation. So I thought I should come and help this year's orientation of freshmen get off to a good start.

I also was thinking, I confess, after your rousing welcome, that if I were still a candidate for public office I might get up and say hello and sit down, and quit while I'm ahead.

I came today to talk about a subject that is not fraught with applause lines, but one that is very, very important to your future: the defense of our nation. At this moment of unprecedented peace and prosperity, with no immediate threat to our security or our existence, with our democratic values ascendant and our alliances strong, with the great forces of our time, globalization and the revolution in information technology so clearly beneficial to a society like ours, with our diversity and our openness, and our entrepreneurial spirit.

At a time like this it is tempting, but wrong, to believe there are no serious long-term challenges to our security. The rapid spread of technology across increasingly porous borders,

raises the specter that more and more states, terrorists and criminal syndicates could gain access to chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons, and to the means of delivering them -- whether in small units deployed by terrorists within our midst, or ballistic missiles capable of hurtling those weapons halfway around the world.

Today I want to discuss these threats with you, because you will live with them a lot longer than I will. Especially, I want to talk about the ballistic missile threat. It is real and growing, and has given new urgency to the debate about national missile defenses, known in the popular jargon as NMD.

When I became President, I put our effort to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at the very top of our national security agenda. Since then, we have carried out a comprehensive strategy to reduce and secure nuclear arsenals, to strengthen the international regime against biological and chemical weapons and nuclear testing, and to stop the flow of dangerous technology to nations that might wish us harm.

At the same time, we have pursued new technologies that could strengthen our defenses against a possible attack, including a terrorist attack here at home.

None of these elements of our national security strategy can be pursued in isolation. Each is important, and we have made progress in each area. For example, Russia and the United States already have destroyed about 25,000 nuclear weapons in the last decade. And we have agreed that in a START III treaty, we will go 80 percent below the level of a decade ago.

In 1994, we persuaded Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, three of the former Soviet Republics, to give up their nuclear weapons entirely. We have worked with Russia and its neighbors to dispose of hundreds of tons of dangerous nuclear materials, to strengthen controls on a list of exports, and to keep weapon scientists from selling their services to the highest bidder.

We extended the nuclear non-proliferation treaty indefinitely. We were the very first nation to sign the comprehensive test ban treaty, an idea first embraced by Presidents Kennedy and Eisenhower. Sixty nations now have ratified the test ban treaty. I believe the United States Senate made a serious error in failing to ratify it last year, and I hope it will do so next year.

We also negotiated and ratified the international convention to ban chemical weapons, and strengthened the convention against biological weapons. We've used our export controls to deny terrorists and potential adversaries access to materials and equipment needed to build these kinds of weapons.

We've imposed sanctions on those who contribute to foreign chemical and biological weapons programs, we've invested in new equipment and medical countermeasures to protect people from exposure. And we're working with state and local medical units all over our country to strengthen our preparedness in case of a chemical or biological terrorist attack, which many people believe is the most likely new security threat of the 21st century.

We have also acted to reduce the threat posed by states that have sought weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, while pursuing activities that are clearly hostile to our long-term interests. For over a decade -- for almost a decade, excuse me -- we have diverted about 90 percent of Iraq's oil revenues from the production of weapons to the purchase of food and medicine.

This is an important statistic for those who believe that our sanctions are only a negative for the people, and particularly the children, of Iraq. In 1989, Iraq earned $15 billion from oil exports, and spent $13 billion of that money on its military. This year, Iraq is projected to earn $19 billion from its legal oil-for-food exports that can spend none of those revenues on the military.

We worked to counter Iran's efforts to develop nuclear weapons and missile technology, convincing China to provide no new assistance to Iran's nuclear program, and pressing Russia to strengthen its controls on the export of sensitive technologies.

In 1994, six years after the United States first learned that North Korea had a nuclear weapons program, we negotiated the agreement that verifiably has frozen its production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. Now, in the context of the United States negotiations with the North, the diplomatic efforts by former Defense Secretary Bill Perry and, most lately, the summit between the leaders of North and South Korea, North Korea has refrained from flight testing a new missile that could pose a threat to America.

We should be clear: North Korea's capability remains a serious issue and its intentions remain unclear. But its missile testing moratorium is a good development worth pursuing.

These diplomatic efforts to meet the threat of proliferation are backed by the strong and global reach of our armed forces. Today, the United States enjoys overwhelming military superiority over any potential adversary. For example, in 1985, we spent about as much on defense as Russia, China and North Korea combined. Today, we spend nearly three times as much, nearly $300 billion a year. And our military technology clearly is well ahead of the rest of the world.

The principle of deterrence served us very well in the Cold War, and deterrence remains imperative. The threat of overwhelming retaliation deterred Saddam Hussein from using weapons of mass destruction during the Gulf War. Our forces in South Korea have deterred North Korea in aggression for 47 years.

The question is, can deterrence protect us against all those who might wish us harm in the future? Can we make America even more secure? The effort to answer these questions is the impetus behind the search for NMD. The issue is whether we can do more, not to meet today's threat, but to meet tomorrow's threat to our security.

For example, there is the possibility that a hostile state with nuclear weapons and long range missiles may simply disintegrate, with command over missiles falling into unstable hands; or that in a moment of desperation, such a country might miscalculate, believing it could use nuclear weapons to intimidate us from defending our vital interests, or from coming to the aid of our allies, or others who are defenseless and clearly in need.

In the future, we cannot rule out that terrorist groups could gain the capability to strike us with nuclear weapons if they seized even temporary control of a state with an existing nuclear weapons establishment.

Now, no one suggests that NMD would ever substitute for diplomacy or for deterrence. But such a system, if it worked properly, could give us an extra dimension of insurance in a world where proliferation has complicated the task of preserving the peace. Therefore, I believe we have an obligation to determine the feasibility, the effectiveness, and the impact of

a national missile defense on the overall security of the United States.

The system now under development is designed to work as follows. In the event of an attack, American satellites would protect the launch of missiles. Our radar would track the enemy warhead and highly accurate, high-speed, ground-based interceptors would destroy them before they could reach their target in the United States.

We have made substantial progress on a system that would be based in Alaska and that, when operational, could protect all 50 states from the near-term missile threats we face, those emanating from North Korea and the Middle East. The system could be deployed sooner than any of the proposed alternatives.

Since last fall, we've been conducting flight tests to see if this NMD system actually can reliably intercept a ballistic missile. We've begun to show that the different parts of this system can work together.

Our Defense Department has overcome daunting technical obstacles in a remarkably short period of time, and I'm proud of the work that Secretary Cohen, General Shelton and their teams have done.

One test proved that it is, in fact, possible to hit a bullet with a bullet. Still, though the technology for NMD is promising, the system as a whole is not yet proven. After the initial test succeeded, our two most recent tests failed, for different reasons, to achieve an intercept. Several more tests are planned. They will tell us whether NMD can work reliably under realistic conditions. Critical elements of the program, such as the booster rocket for the missile interceptor, have yet to be tested.

There are also questions to be resolved about the ability of the system to deal with countermeasures. In other words, measures by those firing the missiles to confuse the missile defense into thinking it is hitting a target when it is not.

There is a reasonable chance that all these challenges can be met in time. But I simply cannot conclude with the information I have today that we have enough confidence in the technology, and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system, to move forward to deployment.

Therefore, I have decided not to authorize deployment of a national missile defense at this time. Instead, I have asked Secretary Cohen to continue a robust program of development and testing. That effort still is at an early stage. Only three of the 19 planned intercept tests have been held so far. We need more tests against more challenging targets, and more simulations before we can responsibly commit our nation's resources to deployment.

We should use this time to ensure that NMD, if deployed, would actually enhance our overall national security. And I want to talk about that in a few moments.

I want you to know that I have reached this decision about not deploying the NMD after careful deliberation. My decision will not have a significant impact on the date the overall system could be deployed in the next administration, if the next President decides to go forward.

The best judgment of the experts who have examined this question is that if we were to commit today to construct the system, it most likely would be operational about 2006 or 2007. If the next President decides to move forward next year, the system still could be ready in the same time frame.

In the meantime, we will continue to work with our allies and with Russia to strengthen their understanding and support for our efforts to meet the emerging ballistic missile threat, and to explore creative ways that we can cooperate to enhance their security against this threat, as well.

An effective NMD could play an important part of our national security strategy, but it could not be the sum total of that strategy. It can never be the sum total of that strategy for dealing with nuclear and missile threats.

Moreover, ballistic missiles, armed with nuclear weapons, as I said earlier, do not represent the sum total of the threats we face. Those include chemical and biological weapons, and a range of deadly technologies for deploying them. So it would be folly to base the defense of our nation solely on a strategy of waiting until missiles are in the air, and then trying to shoot them down.

We must work with our allies, and with Russia, to prevent potential adversaries from ever threatening us with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction in the first

place, and to make sure they know the devastating consequences of doing so.

The elements of our strategy cannot be allowed to undermine one another. They must reinforce one another, and contribute to our national defense in all its dimensions. That includes the profoundly important dimension of arms control.

Over the past 30 years, Republican and Democratic presidents alike have negotiated an array of arms control treaties with Russia. We and our allies have relied on these treaties to ensure strategic stability and predictability with Russia, to get on with the job of dismantling the legacy of the Cold War, and to further the transition from confrontation to cooperation with our former adversary in the most important arena, nuclear weapons.

A key part of the international security structure we have built with Russia and, therefore, a key part of our national security, is the anti-ballistic missile treaty signed by President Nixon in 1972. The ABM treaty limits anti-missile defenses according to a simple principle: neither side should deploy defenses that would undermine the other side's nuclear deterrent, and thus tempt the other side to strike first in a crisis or to take countermeasures that would make both our countries less secure.

Strategic stability, based on mutual deterrence, is still important, despite the end of the Cold War. Why? Because the United States and Russia still have nuclear arsenals that can devastate each other. And this is still a period of transition in our relationship.

We have worked together in many ways. Signed an agreement of cooperation between Russia and NATO. Served with Russian troops in Bosnia and Kosovo. But while we are no longer adversaries, we are not yet real allies. Therefore, for them as well as for us, maintaining strategic stability increases trust and confidence on both sides. It reduces the risk of confrontation. It makes it possible to build an even better partnership and an even safer world.

Now, here's the issue: NMD, if deployed, would require us either to adjust the treaty or to withdraw from it -- not because NMD poses a challenge to the strategic stability I just discussed, but because by its very words, NMD prohibits any national missile defense.

What we should want is to both explore the most effective defenses possible, not only for ourselves, but for all other law-abiding states, and to maintain our strategic stability with Russia. Thus far, Russia has been reluctant to agree, fearing I think, frankly, that in some sense, this system or some future incarnation of it could threaten the reliability of its deterrence and, therefore, strategic stability.

Nevertheless, at our summit in Moscow in June, President Putin and I did agree that the world has changed since the ABM treaty was signed 28 years ago, and that the proliferation of missile technology has resulted in new threats that may require amending that treaty. And again, I say, these threats are not threats to the United States alone.

Russia agrees that there is an emerging missile threat. In fact, given its place on the map, it is particularly vulnerable to this emerging threat. In time, I hope the United States can narrow our differences with Russia on this issue. The course I have chosen today gives the United States more time to pursue that, and we will use it.

President Putin and I have agreed to intensify our work on strategic defense, while pursuing, in parallel, deeper arms reductions in START III. He and I have instructed our experts to develop further cooperative initiatives in areas such as theater missile defense, early warning and missile threat discussions for our meeting just next week in New York.

Apart from the Russians, another critical diplomatic consideration in the NMD decision is the view of our NATO allies. They have all made clear that they hope the United States will pursue strategic defense in a way that preserves, not abrogates, the ABM treaty. If we decide to proceed with NMD deployment we must have their support, because key components of NMD would be based on their territories.

The decision I have made also gives the United States time to answer our allies' questions and consult further on the path ahead.

Finally, we must consider the impact of a decision to deploy on security in Asia. As the next President makes a deployment decision, he will need to avoid stimulating an already dangerous regional nuclear capability from China to

South Asia. Now, let me be clear: no nation can never have a veto over American security, even if the United States and Russia cannot reach agreement; even if we cannot secure the support of our allies at first; even if we conclude that the Chinese will respond to NMD by increasing their arsenal of nuclear weapons substantially with a corollary, inevitable impact in India and then in Pakistan.

The next President may nevertheless decide that our interest in security in 21st century dictates that we go forward with deployment of NMD. But we can never afford to overlook the fact that the actions and reactions of others in this increasingly interdependent world do bear on our security.

Clearly ,therefore, it would be far better to move forward in the context of the ABM treaty and allied support. Our efforts to make that possible have not been completed. For me, the bottom line on this decision is this: because the emerging missile threat is real, we have an obligation to pursue a missile defense system that could enhance our security.

We have made progress, but we should not move forward until we have absolute confidence that the system will work, and until we have made every reasonable diplomatic effort to minimize the cost of deployment, and maximize the benefit, as I said, not only to America's security, but to the security of law abiding nations everywhere subject to the same threat.

I am convinced that America and the world will be better off if we explore the frontiers of strategic defenses, while continuing to pursue arms control, to stand with our allies and to work with Russia and others to stop the spread of deadly weapons.

I strongly believe this is the best course for the United States, and therefore the decision I have reached today, is in the best security interest of the United States. In short, we need to move forward with realism, with steadiness, and with prudence, not dismissing the threat we face, or assuming we can meet it, while ignoring our overall strategic environment, including the interests and concerns of our allies, friends and other nations. A national missile defense, if deployed, should be part of a larger strategy to preserve and enhance the peace, strength and security we now enjoy, and to build an even safer world.

FACT SHEET

National Missile Defense

The Clinton Administration is committed to the development of a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system designed to protect all 50 states from the emerging ballistic missile threat from nations that threaten international peace and security. In the event of an attack, American satellites would detect the launch of missiles; radar would track the enemy warheads; and highly accurate, high-speed ground-based interceptors would destroy missiles before they reach targets in the United States.

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE DECISION

President Clinton announced today that the NMD program is sufficiently promising and affordable to justify continued development and testing, but that there is not sufficient information about the technical and operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system to move forward with deployment.

In making this decision, the President considered the threat, the cost, technical feasibility and the impact overall on our national security of proceeding with NMD. He considered a thorough technical review by the Department of Defense as well as the advice of his top national security advisors.

The Pentagon has made progress on developing a system that can address the emerging missile threat. But we do not have sufficient information to conclude that it can work reliably under realistic conditions. Critical elements of the program, such as the booster rocket for the missile interceptor, have not been tested; and there are questions to be resolved about the ability of the system to deal with countermeasures. The President made clear we should not move forward until we have further confidence that the system will work and until we have made every reasonable diplomatic effort to minimize the costs.

The Pentagon will continue the development and testing of the NMD system. That effort is still at an early stage: three of the nineteen planned intercept tests have been held so far. Additional ground tests and simulations will also take place.

The development of our NMD is part of the Administration's comprehensive national security strategy to prevent potential adversaries from threatening the United States with such weapons and acquiring the weapons in the first place.

Arms control agreements with Russia are an important part of this strategy because they ensure stability and predictability between the United States and Russia, promote the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and help complete the transition from confrontation to cooperation with Russia. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 limits anti-missile defenses according to a simple principle: neither side should deploy defenses that would undermine the other's nuclear deterrent, and thus tempt the other to strike first in a crisis or take countermeasures that would make both our countries less secure.

This announcement will provide additional time to pursue with Russia the goal of adapting the ABM treaty to permit the deployment of a limited NMD that would not undermine strategic stability. The United States will also continue to consult with Allies and continue the dialogue with China and other states.

An NMD program that meets the projected threat

Last August, the President decided that the initial NMD architecture would include: 100 ground-based interceptors deployed in Alaska, one ABM radar in Alaska, and five upgraded early warning radars.

This approach is the fastest, most affordable, and most technologically mature approach to fielding an effective NMD against the projected threat. It would protect all 50 states against emerging threats from both North Korea and the Middle East and is optimized against the most immediate and certain threat, North Korea.

On July 23, 1999, President Clinton signed into law H.R. 4, the "National Missile Defense Act of 1999," stating that it is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective NMD system. The legislation includes two amendments supported by the Administration: the first making clear that any NMD deployment must be subject to the authorization and appropriations process, and thus that no decision on deployment has been made; the second stating it is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces, putting Congress on record as continuing to support negotiated reductions in strategic nuclear arms, reaffirming the Administration's position that missile defense policy must take into account important arms control and nuclear nonproliferation objectives.

NMD Budget

The Clinton Administration has spent approximately $5.7 billion on NMD, and budgeted an additional $10.4 billion in FY 2001-2005 to support possible deployment of the initial NMD architecture.
Our current estimate for developing, procuring and deploying our initial system -- 100 interceptors, an ABM radar, upgrades to 5 early warning radars, and command and control -- is around $25 billion (Fiscal Years 91-09). But to put that in perspective, it represents less than 1 percent of the defense budget over the coming six years.

Joint Statement of Principles on Strategic Stability

At the June 4 Moscow summit, Presidents Clinton and Putin signed a Joint Statement of Principles on Strategic Stability. The Principles state that the international community faces a dangerous and growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including missiles and missile technologies, and that there is a need to address these threats, including through consideration of changes to the ABM Treaty. The Principles also record agreement to intensify discussions on both ABM issues and START III.

Joint Statement on Cooperation on Strategic Stability

The United States has made clear to Russia that we are prepared to engage in serious cooperation to address the emerging ballistic missile threat and have identified a number of specific ideas for discussion. At the June 4 Moscow Summit, Presidents Clinton and Putin signed an agreement to establish a Joint Center for exchanging early warning data on missile launches; they also agreed to explore more far-reaching cooperation to address missile threats.

On July 21 in Okinawa, Presidents Clinton and Putin issued a Joint Statement on Cooperation on Strategic Stability, which identifies specific areas and projects for cooperation to control the spread of missiles, missile technology and weapons of mass destruction.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1626
20 September 2000

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH and RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN TEXTS OF THE JOINT STATEMENT "STRATEGIC STABILITY COOPERATION INITIATIVE" AND THE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN ISSUED AT THE MEETING OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN NEW YORK ON 6 SEPTEMBER 2000

Attached are the Russian and English language texts of the Joint Statement "Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative" and the Implementation Plan issued at the meeting of the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America in New York on 6 September 2000.

We would be grateful if you would issue these texts as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants of the CD as well as mention this document in the appropriate paragraph of the draft CD 2000 annual report.

(Signed) Vasily S. SIDOROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Head of delegation
of the Russian Federation
to the Conference on Disarmament

(Signed) Robert T. GREY, Jr.
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the United States to the
Conference on Disarmament

JOINT STATEMENT

Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative

President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation and President William Jefferson Clinton of the United States of America met today in New York and agreed on a Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative as a constructive basis for strengthening trust between the two sides and for further development of agreed measures to enhance strategic stability and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and missile technologies worldwide. In furtherance of this initiative, the two Presidents approved an implementation plan developed by their experts as a basis for continuing this work.

The Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative builds on the Presidents' agreement in their two previous meetings. The Joint Statement on Principles of Strategic Stability, adopted in Moscow on June 4, 2000, and the Joint Statement on Cooperation on Strategic Stability, adopted in Okinawa on July 21, 2000, establish a constructive basis for progress in further reducing nuclear weapons arsenals, preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty, and confronting new challenges to international security. Russia and the United States reaffirm their commitment to the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability. Russia and the United States intend to implement the provisions of the START I and INF Treaties, to seek early entry into force of the START II Treaty and its related Protocol, the 1997 New York agreements on ABM issues and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and to work towards the early realization of the

1997 Helsinki Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces. Russia and the United States also intend to seek new forms of cooperation in the area of non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies with a view to strengthening international security and maintaining strategic stability within the framework of the Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative between our two countries.

The Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative could include, along with expansion of existing programs, new initiatives aimed at strengthening the security of our two countries and of the entire world community and without prejudice to the security of any state.

START III Treaty and ABM Treaty. Russia and the United States have presented their approaches to the principal provisions of the START III Treaty and on ABM issues. Russia and the United States have held intensified discussions on further reductions in strategic offensive forces within the framework of a future START III Treaty and on ABM issues, with a view to initiating negotiations expeditiously, in accordance with the Moscow Joint Statement of September 2, 1998, Cologne Joint Statement of June 20, 1999 and Okinawa Joint Statement of July 21, 2000 by the two Presidents. They will seek to agree upon additional measures to strengthen strategic stability and confidence, and to ensure predictability in the military field.

NPT, CTBT, FMCT, BWC and Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones. Russia and the United States reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the foundation of the international nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime.

Russia and the United States will seek to ensure early entry into force and effective implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test

Ban Treaty. They will continue to work to begin negotiations to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. They will continue to facilitate the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones in the world, based on voluntary agreements among states in the relevant region, consistent with the relevant 1999 Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, as an important avenue for efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.

Discussions of issues related to the threat of proliferation of missiles and missile technology. Russia and the United States are prepared to expand their discussions of issues related to the threat of proliferation of missiles and missile technologies. These discussions will include annual briefings based on assessments of factors and events related to ballistic and cruise missile proliferation. Annual assessments will address potential threats to international security. With a view to preventing the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction, political and diplomatic measures will be discussed and undertaken, using bilateral and multilateral mechanisms.

Cooperation in the area of Theater Missile Defense. Russia and the United States are prepared to resume and then expand cooperation in the area of Theater Missile Defense (TMD), and also to consider the possibility of involving other states, with a view to strengthening global and regional stability.

The sides will consider as specific areas of such cooperation:

- Expansion of the bilateral program of joint TMD command and staff exercises.

- Possibility of involving other states in joint TMD command and staff exercises.

- Possibility of development of methods for enhanced interaction for joint use of TMD systems.

- Joint development of concepts for possible cooperation in TMD systems.

- Possibility of reciprocal invitation of observers to actual firings of TMD systems.

Early warning information. Russia and the United States, in implementation of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notification of Missile Launches signed in Moscow on June 4, 2000, intend to establish and put into operation in Moscow within a year the joint center for exchange of data to preclude the possibility of missile launches caused by a false missile attack warning. The Parties will also make efforts to come to an early agreement on a regime for exchanging notifications of missile launches, consistent with the statement of the Presidents at Okinawa on July 21, 2000.

Missile Non-Proliferation measures. Russia and the United States intend to strengthen the Missile Technology Control Regime. They declare their commitment to seek new avenues of cooperation with a view to limiting proliferation of missiles and missile technologies. Consistent with the July 21, 2000, Joint Statement of the Presidents at Okinawa, they will work together with other states on a new mechanism to integrate, inter alia, the Russian proposal for a Global Control System for Non-Proliferation of

Missiles and Missile Technologies (GCS), the U.S. proposal for a missile code of conduct, as well as the MTCR.

Confidence and transparency-building measures. Bearing in mind their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Russia and the United States will seek to expand cooperation related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to promote a mutually beneficial technical exchange that will facilitate the implementation of the CTBT after its entry into force. Russia and the United States are prepared to discuss confidence and transparency-building measures as an element of facilitating compliance with, preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty. These measures could include: data exchanges, pre-notifications of planned events, voluntary demonstrations, participation in observations, organization of exhibitions, and strengthening the ABM Treaty compliance verification process.

The Presidents of Russia and the United States have agreed that officials from the relevant ministries and agencies will meet annually to coordinate their activities in this area, and look forward with interest to such a meeting in the near future.

Russia and the United States call upon all nations of the world to unite their efforts to strengthen strategic stability.

The President of the
Russian Federation

The President of the
United States of America

New York City, 6 September 2000

Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative

Implementation Plan

Discussions of issues related to the threat of proliferation of missiles and missile technologies

The United States will brief Russia on the update of the National Intelligence Estimate of the ballistic missile threat that has just been completed, and Russia will provide its latest assessment.

Cooperation in the area of Theater Missile Defense

Russia and the United States agreed to conduct a Russian-U.S. planning and simulation exercise in February, 2001 at Colorado Springs, Colorado and a Russian-U.S. field training exercise at Fort Bliss, Texas by late 2001 or early 2002. Planning meetings for the 2001 exercise will continue in Moscow in September and November - December at the Joint National Test Facility in Colorado Springs. Joint TMD exercise expert talks will also discuss the possibility of reciprocal invitation of observers to actual firings of TMD systems.

Early -warning information

By the end of this fall, Russia and the United States expect to begin preparation of the Moscow site for the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) and begin renovation of the building that will house the center, as well as begin drafting concept of operations and standard operating procedures documents. Russia and the United States intend to commence operations at the JDEC in June of 2001, with full operations to begin in September

2001. Regular meetings of working groups under the Joint Commission will take place in coming months.

Russia and the United States have agreed to set as an objective the completion of a bilateral agreement on a pre-launch notification system for launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles by the APEC summit in November, while also reaching agreement on how the system will be opened up to the voluntary participation of all interested countries. They will meet to intensify negotiations in September.

Missile Non-Proliferation measures

Russia and the United States will work to reach consensus among MTCR partners at the October 9-13 Plenary, as well as with other countries, on plans for a global missile non-proliferation approach.

Confidence and transparency-building measures

Experts will meet this fall to review and approve additional warhead safety and security issues for expanded cooperation related to the CTBT. Experts will meet before the end of this year to consider expanded cooperation in the area of computations, experiments and materials. Experts in CTBT monitoring and verification will be scheduled to meet in late 2000 or early 2001 to consider expanded cooperation in this area.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1627
22 September 2000

Original: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Conference on Disarmament submits to the fifty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly its annual report on its 2000 session, together with the pertinent documents and records.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

A. 2000 Session of the Conference

2. The Conference was in session from 17 January to 24 March, 22 May to 7 July and 7 August to 22 September 2000. During this period, the Conference held 25 formal plenary meetings, at which member States as well as non-member States invited to participate in the discussions outlined their views and recommendations on the various questions before the Conference.

3. The Conference also held 7 informal meetings on its agenda, programme of work, organization and procedures, as well as on items of its agenda and other matters.

4. In accordance with rule 9 of the rules of procedure, representatives of the following member States assumed successively the Presidency of the Conference: Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil and Bulgaria.

B. Participants in the Work of the Conference

5. The representatives of Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe participated as Member States in the work of the Conference.

C. Agenda and Programme of Work for the 2000 Session

6. At the 837th plenary meeting on 18 January 2000, the Conference adopted its agenda for the 2000 session in conformity with the rules of procedure. The agenda (CD/1603) reads as follows:

"Taking into account, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and pending the conclusion of its consultations on the review of its agenda, and without prejudice to their outcome, the Conference adopts the following agenda for its 2000 session:

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

2. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

3. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

4. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

7. Transparency in armaments.

8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations."

7. After the adoption of the agenda, the President made the following statement: "In connection with the adoption of the agenda, I, as the President of the Conference, should like to state that it is my understanding that if there is a consensus in the Conference to deal with any issues, they could be dealt with within this agenda".

Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Sudan, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Uruguay and Zambia.

E. Expansion of the Membership of the Conference

14. The importance of the expansion of the membership of the Conference was addressed by delegations in plenary meetings.

15. Requests for membership had been received, since 1982, from the following 21 non-members, in chronological order: Greece, Croatia, Kuwait, Portugal, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Costa Rica, Denmark, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Cyprus, Lithuania, Ghana, Luxembourg, Uruguay, Philippines, Azerbaijan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Armenia, Thailand, Georgia and Jordan.

F. Review of the Agenda of the Conference

16. The importance of the review of the agenda of the Conference was addressed by delegations in plenary meetings.

G. Improved and Effective Functioning of the Conference

17. The importance of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference was addressed by delegations in plenary meetings.

H. Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations

18. In accordance with rule 42 of the rules of procedure, a list of all communications from non-governmental organizations and persons was circulated to the Conference (document CD/NGC/34).

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE DURING ITS 2000 SESSION

19. The substantive work of the Conference during its 2000 session was based on its agenda. The list of documents issued by the Conference, as well as the texts of those documents, are included as appendix I to the report. An index of the verbatim records by country and subject, listing the statements made by

delegations during 2000, and the verbatim records of the meetings of the Conference, are attached as appendix II to the report.

20. The Conference had before it a letter dated 14 January 2000 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations (CD/1602) transmitting all the resolutions dealing with or related to disarmament and international security adopted by the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session in 1999, including those making specific reference to the Conference on Disarmament:

54/44 "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament" (operative paras. 2 and 5)

54/52 "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" (operative paras. 2, 4 and 5)

54/53 "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" (operative paras. 5, 6 and 8)

55/54 C "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes" (operative paras. 1, 4 and 5)

54/54 D "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons" (operative para. 4(b))

54/54 G "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda" (operative paras. 12 and 13)

54/54 M "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels" (operative para. 2)

54/54 N "Regional disarmament" (operative para. 1)

54/54 O "Transparency in armaments" (operative para. 6)

54/54 P "Nuclear disarmament" (operative paras. 9, 10 and 11)

54/54 D "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons" (operative paras. 1 and 2)

54/56 A "Report of the Disarmament Commission" (operative para. 4)

54/56 B "Report of the Conference on Disarmament" (operative paras. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8)

21. At its 837th plenary meeting on 18 January 2000 the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General conveyed to the Conference a message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the opening of the 2000 session (CD/PV.837).

A. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament

22. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on this agenda item, including on nuclear disarmament and on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These are duly recorded in the plenary records of this session.

23. In addition to the documents listed in paragraph 10 above, the following documents dealing with this item were submitted to the Conference:

(a) CD/1609, dated 24 March 2000, entitled "Resolution on nuclear disarmament adopted by the New Zealand Parliament, 23 February 2000", submitted by the delegation of New Zealand;

(b) CD/1614, dated 25 May 2000, entitled "Letter dated 23 May 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Mexico addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting, on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, a portion of the text adopted by consensus by the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, regarding practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty".

B. Prevention of Nuclear War, including all Related Matters

24. During plenary meetings of the Conference, some delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item, and these are recorded in plenary records, previous annual reports of the Conference (in particular paragraphs 62-71 of the 1992 report to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/1173)), related official documents and working papers.

C. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

25. In addition to the documents listed in paragraph 10 above, the following document dealing with this item was submitted to the Conference:

(a) CD/1606, dated 9 February 2000, entitled "Letter dated 9 February 2000 from the Permanent Representative of China to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting a working paper entitled "China's position on and suggestions for ways to address the issue of prevention of an arms race in outer space at the Conference on Disarmament".

26. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item. These are duly recorded in the plenary records of this session.

D. Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

27. Although no new documents were submitted to the Conference specifically under the agenda item during the 2000 session, the documents listed in paragraph 10 above dealt, inter alia, with this item.

28. During plenary meetings of the Conference, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item. These are duly recorded in the plenary records of this session.

E. New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons; Radiological Weapons

29. During plenary meetings of the Conference, some delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item, and these are recorded in plenary records, previous annual reports of the Conference (in particular paragraphs 79-82 of the 1992 report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/1173)), related official documents and working papers.

F. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

30. During plenary meetings of the Conference, some delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item, and these are recorded in plenary records, previous annual reports of the Conference (in particular paragraphs 83-89 of the 1992 report to the General Assembly of the United Nations (CD/1173)), related official documents and working papers.

31. During plenary meetings of the Conference, a number of delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the issue of anti-personnel landmines, the detailed descriptions of which were duly recorded in the plenary records of this session.

32. In addition to the documents listed in paragraph 10 above, the following document dealing with the issue of anti-personnel landmines was submitted to the Conference:

(a) CD/1608, dated 15 March 2000, entitled "Letter dated 14 March 2000 from the Charge d'Affaires, Deputy Permanent Representative of Belarus addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting information about the International Workshop on Humanitarian De-Mining and Mine Stockpile Elimination, which was held in Minsk on 6 and 7 March 2000".

G. Transparency in Armaments

33. Although no new documents were submitted to the Conference specifically under the agenda item during the 2000 session, the documents listed in paragraph 10 above dealt, inter alia, with this item.

submission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, signed by Russia on 24 September 1996, to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation for ratification";

(f) CD/1601, dated 10 January 2000, entitled "Letter dated 13 December 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Peru addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a text entitled "Lima Calling" adopted by the Member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) during the Sixteenth Regular Session of the General Conference of the Agency, held in Lima, Peru, on 30 November and 1 December 1999";

(g) CD/1604, dated 24 January 2000, entitled "Letter dated 14 January 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Norway addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the English summary of a Government Report on Exports of Defence Materiel from Norway in 1998";

(h) CD/1605, dated 27 January 2000, entitled "Letter dated 26 January 2000 from the Permanent Representatives of China and the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a joint statement made by President Jiang Zemin and President Boris Yeltsin on 10 December 1999";

(i) CD/1607, dated 15 March 2000, entitled "Letter dated 15 February 2000 from the Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Norway addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the Elements of a Common Understanding from the Second Oslo Meeting on Small Arms and Light Weapons, held in Oslo, Norway, on 6 and 7 December 1999";

(j) CD/1610, dated 29 March 2000, entitled "Letter dated 23 March 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Mongolia addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the law of Mongolia on "The nuclear-weapon-free-status" and the Parliamentary Resolution on this subject adopted by the Parliament of Mongolia on 3 February 2000";

(k) CD/1611, dated 25 April 2000, entitled "Letter dated 20 April 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of a statement made

on 14 April 2000 by Mr. Vladimir V. Putin, Acting President of the Russian Federation, in connection with the ratification by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of the START-II Treaty and of the package of 1997 Agreements on Anti-Missile Defence";

(l) CD/1612, dated 26 April 2000, entitled "Letter dated 25 April 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of a statement made on 21 April 2000 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation";

(m) CD/1613, dated 23 May 2000, entitled "Letter dated 22 May 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of a statement made on 18 May 2000 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with the completion of the process of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation";

(n) CD/1615, dated 25 May 2000, entitled "Letter dated 25 May 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of a statement made by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan on the outcome of the Sixth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), held in New York from 24 April to 20 May 2000".

(o) CD/1616, dated 16 June 2000, entitled "Letter dated 7 June 2000 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of relevant extracts on disarmament and international security issues from the Final Document of the XIIIth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held on 8/9 April 2000 in Cartagena, Colombia";

(p) CD/1617, dated 21 June 2000, entitled "Letter dated 19 June 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation and the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the Russian and English language texts of three documents issued at the recent meeting of

the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America in Moscow";

(q) CD/1618, dated 22 June 2000, entitled "Letter dated 21 June 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the paragraphs relating to disarmament contained in the document entitled: 'Cartagena de Indias Declaration Rio Group 2000: Commitment for the Millennium', adopted at the Fourteenth Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government of the Rio Group, held on 15 and 16 June 2000";

(r) CD/1619, dated 27 June 2000, entitled "Letter dated 22 June 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of a statement made on 17 June 2000 by Mr. Vladimir V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation, on the occasion of the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Entry into Force of the Biological Weapons Convention";

(s) CD/1621, dated 6 July 2000, entitled "Operation Mouflon: the Destruction of the South African National Defence Force's (SANDF) Redundant Stockpile of Small Arms and Spare Parts", submitted by the delegation of South Africa;

(t) CD/1622, dated 4 August 2000, entitled "Letter dated 1 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of China to the Conference on Disarmament and the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the Chinese and Russian texts of the Joint Statement made by the Presidents of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on 18 July 2000 concerning anti-missile defence";

(u) CD/1623, dated 8 August 2000, entitled "Letter dated 4 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the Kazakh-United States calibrating experiment "Omega-3" at the former Semipalatinsk test site";

(v) CD/1625, dated 13 September 2000, entitled "Letter dated 6 September 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the text of remarks made by President Clinton on 1 September 2000 at Georgetown University concerning National Missile Defense, as well as a fact sheet on missile defense";

(w) CD/1626, dated 20 September 2000, entitled "Letter dated 19 September 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation and the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the English and Russian texts of the Joint Statement 'Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative' and the Implementation Plan issued at the meeting of the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America in New York on 6 September 2000".

I. Consideration and Adoption of the Annual Report of the Conference and any other Report as Appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations

36. To promote substantive progress during the 2001 session, the Conference requested the current President and the incoming President to conduct appropriate consultations during the intersessional period and to make recommendations, if possible, that could help to commence early work on various agenda items, recognizing the support of the Conference for CD/1624 as a basis for further intensified consultations. These consultations shall, inter alia, take into account proposals and views presented and discussions held in the 2000 session.

37. The Conference decided that the dates for its 2001 session would be:

First part: 22 January-30 March 2001

Second part: 14 May-29 June 2001

Third part: 30 July-14 September 2001

38. The annual report to the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, as adopted by the Conference on 21 September 2000, is transmitted by the President on behalf of the Conference on Disarmament.

Petko Draganov
Bulgaria
President of the Conference

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1627/Corr.1
27 September 2000

ENGLISH ONLY

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Corrigendum

Page 8

The document listed as 54/54 D should read 54/55 D.

GE.00-63461

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1628
18 October 2000

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 18 OCTOBER 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION MADE ON 12 OCTOBER 2000 IN CONNECTION WITH OFFICIAL DOCUMENT CD/1625 CIRCULATED BY THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation made on 12 October 2000 in connection with official document CD/1625 circulated by the delegation of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

I should be grateful if this statement could be issued as an official document to the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed) Vasily SIDOROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Head of delegation of the Russian Federation
to the Conference on Disarmament

GE.00-63879 (E)

Statement by the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

The delegation of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has distributed document CD/1625, which states, *inter alia*, that the Moscow Joint Statement of Principles on Strategic Stability signed by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America on 4 June 2000 contains a provision to the effect that there is a need to address the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including missiles and missile technologies, "including through consideration of changes to the ABM Treaty".

It is incumbent upon us to point out that there is no such provision in the Joint Statement in question. Nor is there such a provision in any other joint document adopted by the Presidents of Russia and the United States of America. The United States is well aware that Russia has never conducted, is not conducting and has no intention of conducting any negotiations with the United States on changing the ABM Treaty with a view to adapting it to the American national anti-missile defence system. Such adaptation is quite simply impossible: the central provision of the ABM Treaty is to prohibit the deployment of ABM systems for the defence of national territory and the creation of the basis for such defence systems, and any change in this provision would leave the Treaty reft of its very purpose.

In our dialogue with the United States on START and ABM, we have repeatedly pointed out, and continue to point out in minute detail, the fatal consequences for disarmament and strategic stability which would result from the collapse of the ABM Treaty. Distorting - inadvertently, we trust - the sense of documents adopted by the Presidents of both countries will serve no constructive purpose. We call upon the United States to focus on joint positive work to safeguard international security and strategic stability while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty, as stipulated in the joint statements by the Presidents of Russia and the United States.

Moscow, 12 October 2000

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1629
15 November 2000

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 14 NOVEMBER 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, MR VLADIMIR V. PUTIN, DATED 13 NOVEMBER 2000, CONVEYING NEW INITIATIVES IN THE FIELD OF THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (START) AND THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS (ABM)

I have the honour to transmit the text of a statement made on 13 November 2000 by the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Vladimir V. Putin, conveying new initiatives in the field of the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (START) and the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM).

I should be grateful if the statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed): Vasily SIDOROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Head of delegation of the
Russian Federation to the
Conference on Disarmament

GE.00-64244 (E)

Statement by the President of the Russian Federation

At the turn of the millennium, the world has come to a critical juncture in nuclear disarmament, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and guarantees for strategic stability. Unquestionable progress has recently been made in this area: highly responsible decisions were taken at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a wide-ranging dialogue on disarmament questions was held at the Millennium Summit in New York, and the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a number of important resolutions. The Russian Federation also made its contribution, ratifying the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), a package of anti-missile defence agreements concluded in New York in 1997, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. A consensus has been reached by the international community: there should be no lull in nuclear disarmament, and the disarmament process should be intensified. There is a real need for substantial progress in this area.

The Russian Federation is ready for this.

We do not see any reason that would prevent further deep reductions in strategic offensive arms. As is well known, we have proposed to the United States of America, including at the highest level, that our goal should be a substantial reduction of the levels of nuclear weapons in our countries to 1,500 units, the completion of which is entirely possible by 2008. But this is not all: we are ready to consider even lower levels at a later time. We agree with the view, which has also been expressed in the United States, that in order to reach such an agreement there is no need to hold drawn-out negotiations and start the whole process from scratch; we already have considerable experience, and there are the treaty mechanisms under START I and START II. We hope that the United States Senate will follow the example of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and complete the ratification of START II and agreements in the field of anti-missile defence. But the main thing now is for the Russian Federation and the United States to begin without delay to take joint and parallel measures to achieve radically lower ceilings for nuclear warheads.

This goal should be achieved while preserving and strengthening the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). We have been told that the international situation has radically changed over the past three decades: there are new missile threats and there is a need to amend the ABM Treaty accordingly. The situation has indeed changed, but not so much as to warrant the dismantling of the existing system of strategic stability through the emasculation of the ABM Treaty. Measures can be taken to counteract the spread of missiles and missile technologies without exceeding the limits of the ABM Treaty; this can be done, first and foremost, through political and diplomatic means. The intensive dialogue between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the missile question is a clear example of this. At the multilateral level, there has been a lively discussion of ways to improve political and legal mechanisms for preventing the spread of missiles, and work is proceeding on a new code of conduct in this area and on the creation of a global missile and missile technology non-proliferation control system.

For those countries that raise the question of a military-technical "safety net", we again propose broad cooperation within the framework of the ABM Treaty in the area of theatre ABM systems. The technological groundwork for this has already been done. One aspect of such cooperation could be the Moscow Centre for the Exchange of Information on Missile Launches, which is currently being set up by the Russian Federation and the United States and which should subsequently be open to all interested countries. We have already invited European and other representatives to join in this effort. I hope that the new leaders of the United States will have no objection to use of the Centre in the interests of strengthening regional and global stability.

At the same time, the Russian Federation is prepared to continue without a pause the dialogue begun more than a year ago with the United States on ABM issues on which we have diverging views. The obligation to consider all questions relating to the ABM Treaty is contained in the 1972 Treaty itself. We are, accordingly, open to continuing such discussions in the Standing Consultative Commission - a forum for negotiations that has been operating successfully since 1973 in accordance with the Treaty - having agreed to raise, when necessary, the level of representation of the parties in the Commission.

The implementation of the Russian Federation's proposed pragmatic and timely programme in the field of real nuclear disarmament will make it possible to strengthen strategic stability and international security on the threshold of the new, twenty-first century.

Kremlin, Moscow, 13 November 2000

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1630
24 November 2000

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 23 NOVEMBER 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION DATED 19 NOVEMBER 2000 ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Vladimir Putin, on the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

I should be grateful if the statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed): Vasily SIDOROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Head of delegation of the Russian Federation
to the Conference on Disarmament

GE.00-64422 (E)

Statement by the President of the Russian Federation

19 November marks the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, a document which plays a key role in strengthening European security.

For the first time in history, an effective control regime for conventional weapons has been established to cover the entire continent, and an unprecedented degree of openness has been achieved in the military sphere. The Treaty has made it possible to carry out a rapid and balanced reduction in a large quantity of surplus armaments and equipment, which came into the possession of the States parties as a legacy of the cold war period. It has helped us to survive without upheaval the epoch-making changes which have taken place in the military and political landscape of Europe over the past decade.

It may be said without exaggeration that throughout these past 10 years, threats to the very existence of the Treaty have been ever-present. They are still with us today. It is important that the States parties should continue to demonstrate their concern to preserve the regime of controls on conventional weapons, and should not put it to any dangerous tests. I have in mind attempts to undermine stability in the area of nuclear weapons, an ill-considered bloc-oriented policy, the use of force in circumvention of the Security Council or other acts which go against the security interests of the partners in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

If due account is taken of these interests, the parties to the Treaty can find a way out of the most difficult situations. One of the most recent examples is the events in Chechnya. The Russian Federation greatly appreciates the understanding with which the forced measures that we took to counteract large-scale terrorist aggression, leading to the flank limitations being temporarily exceeded, have been met.

Unfortunately, the situation in the Northern Caucasus is still complex. In these circumstances, taking account of the obligations assumed a year ago, we are doing everything possible to secure maximum transparency in our actions to defend the State interests of the Russian Federation. In no sense are these actions intended to encroach upon the national security of the countries of the region; on the contrary, they are aimed at gradually reducing the quantity of armaments and equipment which are temporarily in the region and which fall under the Treaty limitations.

We confirm the Russian Federation's adherence to all the Treaty obligations, including the flank limitations, to which we will definitely return when the counter-terrorist operations have been completed.

In accordance with the bilateral agreements reached at Istanbul, and with the interested support of our partners under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the problems of withdrawing Russian forces from the territory of Georgia and the Dniester region are in the process of being solved.

I am certain that the early entry into force of the agreement on adapting the Treaty will strengthen its vitality and make it an effective instrument for ensuring the security of the continent in the twenty-first century. There are no reasons for dragging out the process of ratifying the adapted Treaty. This is our firm position. We are completing the preparations for submitting this document for ratification by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. We have no doubt that the deputies will support it.

In a few weeks humanity will be entering the new millennium. I should like to wish all Treaty partners peace and concord, and to the Treaty itself many years of life, for the benefit of enhanced security in Europe.

Moscow, the Kremlin
19 November 2000

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1631
4 December 2000

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 NOVEMBER 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BRAZIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE BRASÍLIA DECLARATION OF THE REGIONAL PREPARATORY MEETING OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STATES FOR THE 2001 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN ALL ITS ASPECTS ADOPTED IN BRAZIL ON 24 NOVEMBER 2000

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the Brasília Declaration of the Regional Preparatory Meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean States for the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, which was adopted at the Itamaraty Palace, Brasília, Brazil, on 24 November 2000.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for its distribution as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament to all member and participating non-member state delegations.

(Signed) Celso Luiz Nunes Amorin
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Head of the Delegation of Brazil
to the Conference on Disarmament

Brasília Declaration of the Regional Preparatory Meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean States for the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects

Itamaraty Palace, Brasília, Brazil
22-24 November 2000

From 22 to 24 November 2000, the representatives of the Latin American and Caribbean States gathered in Brasilia to seek a common approach in order to contribute with a regional perspective to the work of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects, to be convened in New York from 9 to 20 July 2001, and its Preparatory Committee, so that it may effectively and comprehensively help to address the problems resulting from illicit small arms trafficking.

2. The representatives of the Latin American and Caribbean States reaffirmed the importance of a common approach to the 2001 United Nations Conference that would take into account specific needs and experiences in individual regions, subregions and countries.

3. The representatives acknowledged the pioneering efforts that led to the timely and comprehensive negotiation and conclusion at the Organization of American States of the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Materials.

4. The representatives recalled that the Latin American and Caribbean States share an unshakable commitment to the basic norms of International Law and to those principles enshrined in the Charters of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States: sovereign equality of states; the peaceful resolution of disputes; the prohibition of the use or threat of use of force; and non-intervention in the internal affairs of States.

5. The spirit of friendship and cooperation that has traditionally characterized relations among the Latin American and Caribbean States has been translated into political action through various initiatives and

undertakings in a number of regional and subregional institutions and mechanisms: the Organization of American States, the Association of Caribbean States, the Central American Integration System, the Andean Community, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Mercosur and its Associated States and the Rio Group. The consolidation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace and Cooperation, free of inter-state territorial disputes, is an enduring aspiration and ongoing accomplishment of the entire region.

6. The representatives took note with satisfaction of the "Declaration on the Recovery of Illicit Arms in Civilian Hands in Central America", signed by the Presidents of Central America in January 1997, as a regional contribution to the efforts to diminish the scourge caused by the illicit trade and improper use of small arms and light weapons.

7. The representatives recalled that the illicit trade in small arms in the region is mainly related to drug trafficking, terrorism, transnational organized crime, mercenary activities and other criminal acts and conduct. Crime prevention must thus be an integral part of the approach to combating the illicit trade in small arms.

8. The representatives considered that the Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons provides a promising opportunity to address this problem, in a manner which would alleviate the plight of populations besieged by criminality and armed conflicts which are fueled by this illicit trade, and bring benefits in terms of social and economic development and national, regional and international stability.

9. The representatives reiterated their determination to participate actively in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Furthermore, the Latin American and Caribbean States expressed the belief that the United Nations Conference should adopt a political declaration and a global Program of Action.

10. The representatives expressed their support for the work of the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee and welcomed his proposals on the Objectives and Program of Action as an appropriate basis for continuing with the preparatory process, and made comments and suggestions with a view to developing those proposals.

11. The representatives reaffirmed the commitment to participate actively in the negotiations on the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunitions, with a view to their conclusion in order to strengthen international cooperation in this field.

12. The representatives highlighted the importance of an adequate participation of civil society in the preparatory process and in the Conference in order to contribute to its objectives. In this context, the representatives noted the importance of a balanced representation of NGOs relevant to the scope and purpose of the Conference, which should include appropriate participation of entities from developing countries.

13. The representatives reaffirmed the importance of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and agreed that the outcome of the Conference shall not undermine in any way their inherent right to self-defense, which implies that States also have the right to acquire arms with which to defend themselves.

14. The representatives agreed that the Conference should seek to accomplish the following goals:

(i) to consolidate a global, balanced and non-discriminatory approach to the issue of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, which takes into account the specificities and experiences of regions, subregions and individual countries;

(ii) to strengthen international cooperation in all its aspects (judicial, technical, financial and between law enforcement agencies), and to ensure that the mechanisms established for that purpose should benefit all affected regions, subregions and countries;

(iii) to recognize the importance of the implementation of national measures taken by affected States in post-conflict situations for the recovery of small arms and light weapons. In this regard, the countries which are implementing such measures should be supported by the international community;

(iv) to recommend the adoption of concrete measures, which should be characterized by a flexible, practical and multifaceted approach that would

confer upon regions, subregions and countries necessary capacity in the formulation of those plans that most adequately suit their real needs and specific problems;

(v) to promote constructive and pragmatic approaches within the scope of the Conference;

(vi) to highlight the importance of regional, subregional and national experiences, and to examine new initiatives and undertakings that may further complement, reinforce and politically strengthen measures and agreements already adopted or in the process of implementation;

(vii) to acknowledge that civil society has an important role to play in achieving the goals of the Conference, which could be furthered, including by educational initiatives and publicity campaigns.

15. The representatives acknowledged that the United Nations Regional Center for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean has an important role in the promotion of United Nations activities in this field and welcomed its contributions to the preparatory process of the 2001Conference.

16. After recalling the credentials and expertise of Ambassador Camilo Reyes Rodriguez of Colombia in the fields of diplomacy and disarmament, the representatives of the Latin American and Caribbean States reiterated their full support for his candidacy to chair the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, and noted with satisfaction the endorsement of this candidature by the Non-Aligned Movement.

17. The representatives expressed their recognition of the excellent support given by the Brazilian Government to host the Regional Preparatory Meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean States, which allowed the region to present its contribution to the success of the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects.

Brasilia, 24 November 2000.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1632
29 December 2000

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 DECEMBER 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF CHINA, FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT CONCERNING SECURITY ASSURANCES IN CONNECTION WITH MONGOLIA'S NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE STATUS

Attached is the text of a statement by France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America concerning Security Assurances in Connection with Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status.

We would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member states and non-member participants of the CD.

(Signed): Hubert de la Fortelle
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of France
to the Conference on Disarmament

(Signed): Hu Xiaodi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of China
to the Conference on Disarmament

(Signed): Vasily S. Sidorov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative and
Head of Delegation of the Russian Federation
to the Conference on Disarmament

(Signed): Ian Soutar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom to the
Conference on Disarmament

(Signed): Robert T. Grey, Jr.
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the United States
to the Conference on Disarmament

Statement on Security Assurances in Connection With Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status

France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,

Welcoming the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status,

Taking into account Mongolia's status as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as its unique geographic status,

Welcoming Mongolia's policies of developing peaceful, friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the States of the region and other States,

Confirm the following:

1. France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Mongolia to cooperate in the implementation of UN General Assembly resolution 53/77D of December 4, 1998 with respect to Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Mongolia, as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in accordance with the provisions of UN Security Council resolution 984 of April 11, 1995, if Mongolia should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

3. France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm, in the case of Mongolia, their respective unilateral negative security assurances as stated in their declarations issued on 5 and 6 April 1995 and referred to in UN Security Council resolution 984 of April 11, 1995.

4. The People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation recall and confirm the legally-binding commitments undertaken by them with respect to Mongolia through the conclusion of bilateral treaties with Mongolia regarding these matters.